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Caste Cast in Stone: Sid Harth
http://cogitoergosum.co.cc/2011/02/27/caste-cast-in-stone-sid-harth-3/
Indian Caste Origins: Genomic Insights and Future Outlook
1. Partha P. Majumder
1.
Anthropology and Human Genetics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta 700035, India
The main feature of Indian society, seen at its strongest in the rural areas, is caste. A caste is a collection of people who share similar cultural and religious values and practices. Members within a caste generally marry among themselves; intercaste marriages are a cultural taboo. These social regulations governing the institution of marriage have resulted in a substructuring of the Indian gene pool. There are also elaborate social regulations of avoidance of marriages within castes, and thus there is genomic substructuring even within a caste.
The origins of the castes in India remain an enigma. Many castes are known to have tribal origins, as evidenced from various totemic features that manifest themselves in these caste groups (Kosambi 1964). The caste system in northern India may have developed as a class structure from within tribes: As agriculture spread from the Indus River valley to the Gangetic basin, knowledge and ownership of the means of food production may have created hierarchical divisions within tribal societies (Kosambi 1964). Karve (1961) has also argued that “something very like castes were in India” even before Aryan speakers entered India.
The Aryan world comprised three classes (varnas): priests, nobles, and commoners. Aryans as the conquering people possibly placed their three classes on the indigenous Indian society. The varna organization is hierarchical. Initially, the system had names for two ranks, Brahma (Brahmin) and Kshatra (Kshatriya), Brahmin being of a socially higher rank than Kshatriya. The third rank was made up of Vis, that is, all the subjects. To this society, a fourth rank was added: Shudra, who had no rights to Aryan ritual. In southern India, the menial workers, the so-called “untouchables”, were placed in a new varna, Panchama (meaning fifth). It is conceivable that the Aryan speakers had greater contact, including genetic admixture, with the Brahmins, who were professionally the torchbearers and promoters of Aryan rituals. The Aryan contact should have been progressively less as one descended the varna ladder. The genetic expectation, therefore, is that the proportions of those genes (or genomic features, such as haplotypes or haplogroups) that “characterized” the Aryan speakers should progressively decline from the highest varna to the lowest and a reverse trend should be observed with respect to those genes that “characterized” the indigenous Indians.
Although some previous studies have sought to test this expectation, the observed trends were equivocal. The primary reason was the lack of data on a large uniform set of markers from populations of India and central/west Asia (the region from which the Aryans speakers who entered India originated). The study by Bamshad et al. (2001), who have also sought to test the above expectation, is clearly a landmark. Using a very large battery of genomic markers and DNA sequences, spanning autosomal, mitochondrial, and Y-chromosomal genomic regions, they have shown that the observed trend of genetic admixture estimated from castes belonging to different varnas is congruent with expectations. This trend was observed in each of the three data subsets. The only exception was in respect of mtDNA restriction site haplotypes, which was also noted in a recent study conducted by us (Roychoudhury et al. 2000). However, after combining these haplotype data with DNA sequence data, Bamshad and colleagues were able to capture the expected trend. Thus, this study not only provides a wonderful genomic view of the castes and of their origins, but also underscores the need for careful statistical analysis of genomic data for drawing appropriate inferences.
The use of “upper”, “middle”, and “lower” to designate caste hierarchy is much more recent than the use of varna. Whereas varnas are traditionally defined, different anthropologists have used different definitions of upper, middle, and lower castes, in terms of the castes that they included in each of these clusters. Sometimes these differences in definitions have stemmed from socio-cultural similarities or differences as noted or perceived by different anthropologists, and sometimes ranked caste-cluster compositions were altered for convenience, such as pooling to adjust for small sample sizes. As noted earlier, in studies such as Bamshad et al.’s, the most appropriate classification is by varna. As the reader will note, the authors have analyzed their data using different compositions of hierarchical caste-clusters and have obtained homologous results. However, it needs to be emphasized that traditional varna system is the only unequivocally accepted hierarchical system. In studies pertaining to the origins of castes, one is liable to draw incorrect inferences by including castes belonging to different varnas in the same ranked cluster.
Bamshad et al. have chosen to study caste populations drawn from a restricted geographical region of India. They have rightly emphasized the need to replicate their findings. This is absolutely essential because, as Karve (1961) has noted, “it is not generally realized that the caste society in a sense was a very elastic society.” Indeed, a caste bearing the same name may have very different origins in different geographical regions. There are examples in which a tribe dispersed over a large geographical region, took up different occupations in different sub-regions, and “fitted” itself into the caste hierarchy on different rungs. Karve’s work has also indicated that each of the different Brahmin castes (Chitpavan, Sarasvat, etc.) in Maharashtra probably has a different origin. Thus, the origin of caste populations may not be uniform over the entire India geographical space, and it is crucial to undertake studies to replicate Bamshad et al.’s findings. Finally, I would also like to suggest that in future studies bearing on the origins of the Indian castes, it would be a good idea to include tribal populations inhabiting the same region along with the caste populations.
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Footnotes
*
E-MAIL ppm{at}isical.ac.in; FAX 91-33-577 3049.
*
Article and publication are at www.genome.org/cgi/doi/10.1101/gr.192401.
* Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press
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Andhra fatwa draws flak
SANTOSH SINGH
Patna, June 21: Muslim social scientists, politicians and religious gurus turn down Jamia Nizamia’s fatwa against classifying Muslims into castes for providing reservation.
They hold while Islam might not provide for castes among Muslims, there have been castes and sub-castes and “a clear-cut social and educational divide” among Muslims.
The All India Pasmania Muslim Mahaz, promoting social equality and political empowerment, has termed the Hyderabad’s Islamic seminaries’ fatwa “un-Islamic and irrational”.
The organisation’s president and JD(U) Rajya Sabha member, Ali Anwar, told The Telegraph: “It is a fact that neither Islam nor the Quran talks about castes but caste has been a reality in Muslim society since ages.”
Anwar explained Arabian jurisprudence divides Muslims into three categories — Ashraf (elite), Ajlaf (artisan class) and Arjal (dalits). “Sachchar Committee has used the three terms to elaborate caste divide among Muslims justifying a need for reservation for socially and educationally backward Muslims, he said.
Ashraf includes Saiyads, Moghuls, Arabs, Pathans, Sheikhs, Qazi, Mullick and Mirzas, Ajlaf has artisan classes having Ansari, Raini, Mansoori and sundry other surnames and Arjal has “Muslim marginalised and untouchables’ such as dhobis, halalkhor and dhuniya.
The Rajya Sabha member, who considers himself a social scientist, said: “No Islamic seminaries can prove that there is no caste in Muslims, It is rampant and reeking and hence, a fatwa is un-Islamic, irrational and preposterous.”
Right from Kaka Kalelhar Commission to Mandal Commission to Bihar government’s Mungeri Lal Commission have observed that castes were a reality.
Islam, he said, is a religion of equality and Muslim religious gurus have no business to let inequality continue by resisting reservation on caste lines. “Anyway, Islam believes in helping the poor and hence, reservation is very much in consonance with religious spirit,” said Anwar.
Coincidentally, retired IAS officer P.S. Krishnan submitted a 300-page report to Andhra Pradesh government two days ago recommending not to give reservation to “the elite — Saiyad, Mushaik, Mughal, Pathan, Bohra, Arab, Irani, Siya, Imami, Ismailis, Khoja, Cutchi Mamon, Jamayat and Nawayat”. The Bihar minister of state for housing and construction, Monazir Hasan said: “Though I am not given to speak against religious gurus, I vouch for reservation to dalit OBCs.” The minister said reservation was a must for marginalised Muslims as they did not enjoy legal protection as SCs/ STs get under Atrocities Act.
Muslims and caste
The information in this essay is taken from the works listed here. For research purposes please consult these and other relevant scholarly sources.
That there should be caste among Muslims seems like a contradiction. Islam, having originated as the ideological basis for the political unification of the Arab tribes, teaches that all believers are equal in the eyes of God. In the Koran the following verse is revealed to Mohammed when some new converts question his choice of an African follower to call the people to prayer:
O Mankind! We have created you from male and female and have made you into peoples and tribes that you may know one another; truly, the noblest among you before God are the most pious among yourselves…. (49:13)
If Muslims believe that it’s piety, not birth, that counts before God, how can they recognize congenital distinctions of caste? And how can caste exist outside of Hinduism, with no karma or dharma, no vedas or brahmins?
The answer is the caste system is not just an ideological formation. It’s a basic institution of Indian society (which historically included Pakistan and Bangladesh), rooted in the material relations of production on which that society is founded. Muslims in India do not make up a separate society with their own political economy. They live in the same villages as Hindus and traditionally participate along with them–as patrons or clients–in the pre-capitalist systems of labor extraction that caste grows out of. These old productive relations have weakened since the 1960s but they cannot be swept away without a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution and the building of an egalitarian socialist society. Until that happens, the villages–where three-fourths of all Indians live, with a majority of the rest linked to their “home village” by family ties and hereditary custom–will continue to cultivate and spread the bacillus of caste like a hundred million Petri dishes.
Like their Hindu, Sikh, and Christian neighbors, Muslims in India are born into endogamous, hereditary, and for the most part occupationally specific groups ranked according to their relative ritual purity–castes by almost any definition. Just as Indian Muslims speak a language (Urdu) that derives from Sanskrit with Arabic and Persian accretions, they practice a variant of the Hindu caste system that gets its ideological sanction from Islamic sources.
And you can find such sources without looking too far. The egalitarian ideals of Islam (like those of its progenitor, Christianity) contradict people’s actual life not just in India but in any existing society. There is no record that these ideals were ever generally put into practice anywhere. Mohammed left existing hierarchies within converted tribes intact; the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet presuppose that Muslims keep slaves.
From the beginning, those in the Islamic world who could trace their genealogy to Mohammed (who said, “There are no genealogies in Islam”) and even to his tribe partook of nobility. Islamic jurisprudence later codified this notion and generalized it into the principle that, with certain specific allowances for wealth and learning, the longer Islam has been in your family or tribe or ethnic group, the higher your status.
It is this principle that is invoked to explain the basic division between high and low Muslim castes. Islam spread to India through invaders from established Muslim societies in the Near East and Afghanistan. The great mass of Indian Muslims, however, descend not from these conquerors, but from sections of the indigenous population who converted under their influence during the centuries of their rule. So those castes said to trace their lineages to the invaders, and therefore to have had Islam in their families for a longer time (this traditional ulamic distinction conveniently coinciding with reputed descent from the old foreign-derived ruling classes) are called ashraf (literally, “noble”). The other, inferior castes–the ajlaf (“lowly”)–are supposed to descend from the native converts. Seventy-five per cent of Muslims are born into ajlaf castes.
The line between ashraf and ajlaf castes corresponds to that between the upper three, “twice-born” varnas in the Hindu system (brahmins, kshatriyas, and vaishyas) and the sudras and untouchables beneath them. Nothing analogous to the phenomenon of “uppercaste sudras”–wealthy, landowning sudra castes like the kammas and reddis of Andhra who are treated as high-ranking despite their low varna–seems to exist among Muslims, probably because a prospering ajlaf caste can in time more easily move up to ashraf status.
The ashraf castes are broken down into four categories for purposes of ranking: Sayyads, Sheiks, Mughals, and Pathans. Like the four varnas of the Hindu system, these are not castes (in the sense of jatis) but ways of classifying castes according to a theoretical hierarchy. Into each category thousands of individual local endogamous castes are assigned a place.
The highest castes are those said to descend directly from Mohammed through his daughter Fatima and Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam, called the Sayyads (literally, “princes”). Next come the Sheiks (“chiefs”)–castes outside the Sayyad category who nonetheless trace their origin to the Arabs, the people among whom Islam first spread. Castes within the next two categories are those reputed to derive from further outside the historical center of the Muslim world. Since their ancestors would presumably have had less time to practice Islam, these castes, while still ashraf, have relatively lower status. The Mughal castes are supposed to have descended from the invaders who founded the Mughal dynasty (who were actually a mixture of Central Asian peoples, but who fancifully claimed descent from Genghis Khan and the Mongols), while the Pathan castes trace their origin to the Pathan (now called Pashtun) tribes of Afghanistan.
Despite these claims, the four ashraf categories are not ethnic groups. The Sayyad and Sheik castes, for example, do not speak Arabic or follow Arab customs. Whether any of them have actual genealogical links to the Near East is open to question. Caste rankings among Muslims are not based on a caste’s historical origins–which can rarely, if ever, be known–but on the social consensus about those origins, and thus ultimately on relations of political and economic power.
That the ashrafs claim extra-Indian descent doesn’t mean they see themselves as any less Indian. Frank S. Fanselow writes of a large ashraf community he studied in the Tamil town of Kayalpattnam:
In relation to wider Indian society, Kayalpattnam Muslims identify themselves as Indians. Precisely because of their claim to a non-Indian ethnic origin, they strongly identify themselves politically as Indians. During the Indo-Pakistan war, funds were raised by the town’s population ‘in support of the national defense effort’ and its guest book proudly exhibits signatures from the visits of the former President R. Venkataraman and late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
The Islamic principles of social ranking that justify caste among Indian Muslims do not account for it. In no society outside of the subcontinent have Muslims ever been so rigidly and elaborately stratified by descent. Why do Muslims practice caste there and nowhere else? The cultural influence of neighboring, numerically dominant Hindus is sometimes put forward. But unless you explain why this influence worked so powerfully in this way but not in every way, that kind of answer simply replaces the question “why do Muslims in India have caste?” with “why are there Muslims in India?” For the basis of caste among Indian Muslims you have to look beyond culture alone to the underlying relations of production.
In villages, the ashrafs are typically the dominant Muslim landowners. (There are also poor ashrafs, just as many high-caste Hindus are poor.) It is conjectured that most ajlafs started out as low-caste Hindu service castes in places where the dominant landowning caste was Muslim and over the generations adopted Muslim customs as group in emulation of their superiors. Traditionally the lower-caste families in a village, whether Hindu or Muslim, would be bonded by hereditary obligation to the family of the uppercaste landlord (or, in earlier systems, to the village as a whole), to whom they were required to provide specialized services (as barbers, potters, carpenters, vegetable-sellers, and so on) for customary compensation or none at all. These days the dominant household’s patronage is often replaced by cash payment, and some of the traditional services have recently been supplanted by modern industry. Many of the low-caste artisans who remain in the villages are now reduced to impoverished smallholders and unskilled laborers. This new condition has not made them any less dependent on uppercaste landowners.
Each ajlaf caste has a traditional occupation, which may or may not be practiced today. It is usually by this occupation that each caste is known, or rather the name of the occupation and that of the caste that practices it is the same word: they are weavers, butchers, oil-pressers, candy-makers, bangle-sellers, acrobats, laborers, beggars, scavengers, and so on. While all Hindu castes, including the higher ones, have occupations assigned to them–brahmins are traditionally priests, kshatriyas military and political elites, vaishyas merchants–the ashraf Muslim castes do not. This marks a difference from the Hindu system, although, as Imitaz Ahmad points out, in practice people from higher Hindu castes can also take up a different occupation more easily. Brahmins today are as likely to be doctors or engineers or sociologists as priests.
The Muslim service castes are ranked like Hindu castes according to the relative ritual purity of their occupation–with tailors above washermen (who deal with bodily dirt) and washermen above the caste that skins animals to make drums (who deal with dead things). All of this is strikingly similar to Hindu caste ranking, despite the fact that notions of purity and pollution have no place in the Islamic ideological tradition. According to one report, even though Muslims have no taboo against eating beef, a butcher who deals only in mutton is ranked higher than one who deals in mutton and beef.
Another factor goes toward determining the rank order of Muslim castes: how close the performance of their occupation places them to the dominant caste. Zarina Bhatty cites the example in one village of two castes whose occupation is to entertain with singing and female dancing. Both castes do the same thing, but the one whose job is to entertain the ashraf landlord families is higher than the other, whose members sing and dance for one and all. This principle is unknown among Hindus. In this way the Muslim system, whose ideological cloak is flimsier, may reflect its basis in class relations more transparently.
Among Muslims as among Hindus, castes are organized locally on the basis of caste brotherhood (biradari). Those born into another caste, even though they may be on the same social level and practice the same occupation, are excluded from this brotherhood. Each brotherhood is normally governed by a committee of elders (panchayat) that has the power to settle disputes within the caste. It punishes members who break caste and dishonor the brotherhood, the worst punishment being expulsion, which traditionally entailed not only social ostracism but the loss of one’s livelihood.
Although any marriage outside of one’s caste goes against the norm, among ashrafs it is easier to marry into another caste that falls within the same category (Sayyad, Sheik, Mughal, or Pathan), and it’s easier for Sayyads and Sheiks to intermarry than for a member of one of these two higher categories to marry into a Mughal or Pathan caste. Marriages between ashrafs and ajlafs are naturally highly taboo: Zarina Bhatty, in a paper published in 1996, reports that “[m]arriage alliances between Ashrafs and non-Ashrafs are still inconceivable and not a single instance of this is known to have occurred in living memory” in the village she studied.
In general, marriage between people of different castes is more common among ashrafs than ajlafs. This has sometimes been cited as a difference between the Muslim and Hindu systems, but Imitaz Ahmad points out that intercaste marriage is exceptional in either system, and that among Hindus it is also more likely to occur among the higher castes. Such matches are usually attempts by the bride’s family to raise their status by marrying into a caste higher than their own (what sociologists call hypergamy), and, just as you need money to make money, you need status to raise your status.
Ajlaf castes often follow restrictions on taking food from or eating together with each other according to notions of ritual purity. Ashraf castes will usually eat with each other, but in most places they will not eat with ajlafs. David Mandelbaum cites an incident reported in 1962 by Zarina Ahmad that took place in a village in Lucknow district:
One of the guests at a wedding in an Ashraf family was a woman of the manihar, bangle-seller jati [caste] who had just returned to the village after a long absence. Her husband had prospered; she wore expensive clothes, and, not being recognized as she came in, she was seated at a table with Ashraf ladies. In the middle of the meal, one of the Ashraf women recognized her; the other women ‘at once stood up and refused to sit at the same table with the manihar woman. It caused a lot of embarrassment, but the manihar lady had to sit and eat on the floor.’ In their precipitous, upright act these Muslim ladies were doing what Hindu ladies of high jati would also do in like circumstances.
Ajlaf castes that happen to prosper and get some surplus land usually try to raise their rank by becoming more religiously orthodox. This Muslim version of the increased attention to purity and piety among aspiring Hindu castes that sociologist M. N. Srinivas called “Sanskritization” is often called “Islamization” by analogy.
The biggest step in starting down this road is the veiling and secluding of the women of the caste: “As soon as a lower class Muslim makes money, he puts his women in purdah (a practice observed only by the Ashrafs), starts going to the communal prayers in the mosque and goes to Mecca for pilgrimage” (Zarina Ahmad, cited by David Mandelbaum). Purdah is a sign not only of orthodoxy and female chastity, but also of wealth: women locked up at home can’t go out to work and have to employ servants to get their housework done. Women’s oppression in India is closely linked to the caste system. Among Muslims as among Hindus it gets worse for women, ironically, the higher up the caste scale you go. At least until you get to the very highest and richest castes, which in most places, following an opposing trend of Westernization, have started allowing their women to get educated and take professional jobs in order to raise their value in the marriage market. Mandelbaum nicely describes these high-caste Muslim women’s way of life as combining “Islamic precepts, Ashraf manners, and modern mores,” while observing that “[t]hese elite standards are beyond an ordinary Muslim villager’s knowledge and certainly beyond his reach.”
In the end, a rising Muslim caste is likely to start claiming that they are after all descended from a foreign line. The next step is to try to get their girls married into established ashraf castes, hoping by and by to secure their claim to the point where they’re in a position to receive girls from these castes as well.
“We used to be butchers and now we are Sheiks,” a common joke goes. “Next year if the harvest prices are good for us, we shall be Sayyads” (Mandelbaum). While this timetable needs to be stretched out by at least a generation or two, it is often said to be easier for a Muslim caste than a Hindu caste to rise. Among Muslims, according to Mandelbaum, “[s]ecular power is brought to bear more quickly and forcefully in gaining higher rank.”
In either system, of course, castes are not supposed to be able to rise, and one that does is seen as getting away with something. But, in practice, once a formerly ajlaf caste comes to be generally accepted as ashraf, who can say it is any less genuinely so than other castes who claim that status? Or that the foreign descent of those other castes is any more firmly established, just because it’s been accepted longer? Between 1901 and 1931 the number of people who said they belonged to Sheik castes (a status commonly claimed, like that of kshatriyas among Hindus, by castes trying to move up) went up by over 150 per cent, which is of course well above the natural rate of increase. As an ancient Hindu text teaches, “The origin of seers, rivers, great families, women, and sin cannot be found out.”
For Hindus and Muslims alike, the really hard part of rising is the material prerequisite: for an oppressed low caste to acquire surplus land.
While the caste practices of Muslims reveal the workings among them of the principles of purity and pollution, these ideas–which seem to be psychologically necessary to the functioning of a caste system–have no place in their expressed ideology. Without this conscious reinforcement, the social restrictions that depend on these principles tend to be less rigid than they are among Hindus. The Muslims’ legitimation of caste–unlike the Hindus’, which emerged organically from its social roots–is a makeshift. It doesn’t fit perfectly. Here it pinches and here it is a little loose.
Although ashrafs in most places do avoid eating with ajlafs, an ashraf man may do so if he chooses without fear of losing caste or other formal penalty such as a high-caste Hindu might face. Among Muslims personal pollution (which you get from doing impure things like having sex, menstruating, giving birth, emptying your bowels, and touching dead bodies or human waste) is not, like permanent pollution (which makes you unclean by the caste you have been born into), transmissible by touch. If an untouchable touches you, you need to do something purify yourself, but (unlike among Hindus) if a menstruating woman from a clean caste touches you, you don’t. Muslims have no prescribed way to purify themselves after doing something unclean. Since there are no elaborate rituals for this purpose like there are among Hindus, they have to make do with simply washing or saying a namaz. The castes at the top of the Muslim system, the Sayyads, have no special ritual status or role like the brahmins do–they’re noble but not charismatic.
Caste among Muslims is felt least of all in strictly religious contexts, where the countervailing influence of the scriptural tradition is at its strongest. All Muslim men in a village (except, sometimes, the untouchables) pray shoulder to shoulder in a line inside the mosque. A low-caste man who manages to get a religious education can become a mullah.
Muslims normally deny there are castes among them. At most they’ll admit that caste is practiced by some other Muslims in the next village, or perhaps in the poorer sections of their own village, who are not real Muslims like they are. Frank S. Fanselow in a study of several Muslim communities in Tamil Nadu tries to explain why this is so. Since colonial times the caste system has been seen as the hallmark of Hinduism. And from the time of the independence movement, and increasingly since the 1980s, Hindu and Muslim have become important and mutually exclusive social identities. These two modern perceptions have come together to produce “the basic, logical equation that one cannot be a real Muslim and have caste…. Hence to ask whether Muslims have caste is equivalent to asking whether Muslims are Hindus.” So the Muslim denial of caste is not a collective case of bad conscience, it’s a simple assertion of communal identity in the current ideological context. That despite this denial Muslims do have caste shows how artificial these new, airtight communal identities are.
Fundamentalism has been spreading among Indian Muslims in recent decades, led by Islamizing middling castes, in part as a response to the rise of Hindu nationalism. Zarina Bhatty wonders why, since this revival aims at “making the Muslim–individual and community–visibly more Muslim” by flaunting what distinguishes them (the call to prayer, religious observances, the enforcement of traditional personal laws, religious education in madrasas), it has not attacked the practice of caste. She suggests that “having been adopted and endogenized, the social order has become normative and a part of Indian Muslim tradition”: the caste system has become so natural a part of Muslim life in India that its contradictions with scriptural Islam are by now invisible. But it’s not necessary to speculate this far–the high-caste and aspiring high-caste social base of fundamentalism doesn’t question the current caste-based order because it has a basic class interest in letting it be. In fact, as Imtiaz Ahmad points out, “Islamizaton serves to reinforce rather than weaken or eliminate caste distinctions.”
The extent and severity of untouchability among Muslims is variously reported and probably differs more from place to place than among Hindus. Where untouchable Muslim castes exist, other Muslim castes–including clean ajlaf castes–avoid touching them, eating with them, or taking food from them. In many places they are not allowed to go into mosques and cannot be buried with clean Muslims. Like other untouchables, they have the most ritually impure traditional occupations, from removing dead cows from the road to carrying off human shit in a basket. Any caste, Muslim or Hindu, that is treated as untouchable by one community will be treated like that by everyone in the village. This is one of many ways in which the Muslim and Hindu caste systems are functionally integrated, so that it might be more precise to say that Muslims participate with Hindus in a common South Asian system, regulating themselves independently within it.
Those who would like to see ajlaf Muslims get reserved seats in public universities and government jobs according to their proportion in the total population–like those constitutionally granted to Hindu untouchables (dalits)–call the ajlafs “dalit Muslims” or “Muslim dalits.” These terms are a little misleading, as the ajlaf communities include those equivalent to clean Hindu backward castes as well as to untouchable ones. Even strictly untouchable Muslims have since 1950 been denied reservations by law, along with untouchable Christians–the government wants to discourage untouchables from leaving Hinduism for a faith that accords them even nominal equality. Untouchable or not, the great majority of Muslims are oppressed by uppercaste Muslims and Hindus on the basis of caste.
And all Muslims are aligned in casteist thinking with low castes and untouchables for eating beef. Although probably the worst atrocity to come out of the recent RSS/BJP “cow protection” campaign so far occurred when five untouchables were lynched in front of police because of a rumor that they had killed a scavenged cow they were skinning, the campaign itself is principally aimed against Muslims.
Although there are fewer studies of caste in Pakistan, where 97 percent of the population is Muslim, its prevalence among Muslims there is well documented. David Mandelbaum cites three studies of villages in the Punjab and Sindh made around 1960. In one of these villages “[a] child learns the caste it belongs to from the time it begins to speak and tells it when he gives his personal name;” in another “[t]he first question to be asked from a visitor is about his caste.” In the same year Fredrik Barth published a classic study of an interesting variant of caste practiced in Northwest Pakistan. In this system only a handful of polluted castes at the bottom and the very highest caste at the top are differentiated according to ritual purity, with interaction among all others regulated by shame and privilege. When a man from a high (that is, landowning) caste loses all his land in this region, his sons do not inherit his caste and slip into the tenant-farmer caste. In 1979 Pieter Streefland published a study of a segregated “sweeper” caste in Karachi that is one of several treated as untouchable there.
In studies published between 1983 and 1993 of several villages in Bangladesh (whose population is 83 per cent Muslim and 84 per cent rural) A. F. Imam Ali has found both Muslims and Hindus there to be elaborately stratified by caste. According to a report in the Indian Express (September 20, 2000), Hindu untouchables in the capital city of Dhaka are employed for the most part in the most menial and despised occupations: household servants, pig-breeders, street vendors, rickshaw-pullers, and several thousand of them as municipal cleaners earning just over a dollar a day.
Social Stratification Among
Muslims In India
By Salil Kader
15 June, 2004
Countercurrents.org
Islam entered India almost immediately after its birth in the 7th century A.D and made its way into different parts of the country. In the south it entered through the present day state of Kerala situated on the Malabar Coast (1) in South India (Bahauddin, 1992: 18). Its carriers were the Arab traders who had been involved in trade activities with India even before the times of Prophet Muhammad (praise be upon him). During their numerous voyages to the Malabar region, the Arab traders established matrimonial relationships with the local women and had many progeny from these marriages. This resulted in the spread of Islam to different parts of the region. Many Sufi saints accompanied these traders and under the influence of their preaching and the attraction of an egalitarian faith many local people, mainly from lower classes, converted to Islam (Kurup, 1991: 80). A major factor to be borne in mind here is that Islam’s first step on Indian soil was not, as many would like to believe, riding on the wave of the sword. In the North, Islam came along with the invasion of Muhammad bin Qasim, a general of Yusuf bin Hajjaj, the governor of Iraq during the Umayyad period. (Lal, 1984: 12-17). This was followed by the many invasions of Muhammad Ghori and Mahmud Ghazni, both interested merely in the enormous wealth and riches that India offered. The two were never interested in occupying and ruling the land of India. Their main focus was to plunder, pillage and transfer as much wealth as possible to their respective capitals since this was crucial for them to maintain their large armed forces and entourage used in their frequent military campaigns.
The history of Islam in India is well over a thousand years old today. It has blended beautifully into the background of its adopted land and contributed immensely to the formation of a composite Indian culture and the building of the Indian nation. But this Islam and its practitioners are not a homogeneous entity as is widely believed. In fact there is a great deal of diversity in the manner in which Islam is practiced and perceived throughout India. This is hardly surprising considering the facts that Islam in India is almost as old as the faith itself and that its followers in different regions of the country represent a myriad of cultures. In this process of adapting to the variety of cultural milieus, Islam has acquired many hues and should not be considered as a monolithic entity. Nevertheless, Muslims in India have responded well to the challenges of living as a minority in a religiously plural society. But this process of assimilation into the Indian society has not been an easy one and the challenges that Muslims of India face today continue to exist with the constantly shifting national and international state of affairs.
Social Stratification as Internal Challenge:
For purposes of better understanding, the challenges that confront the community today can be categorised into external and internal challenges. The external challenges are those, which emanate from factors that exist outside the community. The most important among these factors would undoubtedly be the Muslims of India being constantly viewed as ‘fifth-columnists’ harbouring ‘extra-territorial loyalties’ and a ‘pro-Pakistan sentiment.’ Despite having contributed to just about every sphere of life – be it sports, politics, movies and music, fine arts or literature – Muslims are still questioned about their role in the growth and development of India. The accusations of perfidy and disloyalty against the Muslims originate largely from the constituents of the Sangh Parivar like Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party. These allegations need to be rebutted by the community, unitedly and in a systematic, logical manner. However, that could be the subject matter for another essay. This article intends to deal with an internal challenge that threatens to debilitate the community be striking at its very roots. The threat being referred to here is the caste-based discrimination practised by certain sections of Muslims in India.
The Holy Quran says,
“O mankind! We (God) created you from a single pair of male and a female; and made you into peoples and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous among you…
(The Holy Quran, Surah al-Hujuraat, verse 13)
This verse makes it quite clear that though Islam accepts differentiation based on gender and tribe, it does not recognise social stratification. But in reality, the Muslim community remains diversified, fragmented and as caste-ridden as any other community of India (Alam, 2003: 4881). In fact the levels of stratification witnessed within the Muslim community of India totally negate this Quranic edict. Imtiaz Ahmad’s seminal work, Caste and Social Stratification Among Muslims in India (1973) and more recently, Ali Anwar’s Masawat ki jung: Pasemanzar Bihar ka Pasmanda Musalman (2001) in Hindi have convincingly demonstrated the reality of caste among Indian Muslims. However, it should be acknowledged that this discriminatory practice among Muslims, observed more in North India than South India, is not as much pronounced, oppressive and widespread as amongst the Hindus. But that is hardly comforting. The fact that discrimination based on caste lines exists within the Muslim community of India is cause enough for consternation.
Most Indian Muslims are descendants of ‘untouchable’ and ‘low’ caste converts, with only a small minority tracing their origins to Arab, Iranian and Central Asian settlers (Sikand, 2003). Muslims who claim foreign descent assert a superior status for themselves as ashraf or ‘noble’. Descendants of indigenous converts are, on the other hand, commonly referred to contemptuously as ajlaf or ‘base’ or ‘lowly’ (Zainuddin, 2003). Going by this classification, an overwhelming 75% of Muslim population of India would fall into the ajlaf category (Anwar, 2001). But conversion to the egalitarian faith of Islam has not helped their cause. The ajlaf continue to be discriminated against by the Muslim upper caste (Sahay, 2003).(2) The ill treatment meted out to the lower and backward caste Muslims has led to a movement for recognition of the lower caste Muslims or ‘Dalit Muslims’ as Scheduled Castes, on par with the lower castes in the Hindu society (Sikand, 2003). The leaders of this movement have demanded reservations for ‘Dalit Muslims’ based on the concept of positive discrimination enshrined in Article 341 of the Indian Constitution, which authorises the President to declare certain castes as Scheduled Castes for special benefits (Diwan, 1979: 370). At the same time, one of the leaders of this movement Dr.Ejaz Ali, rather curiously, protested the denial of burial rights to lower caste Muslims in Bihar by stating that it was ‘against the basic tenets of Islam’ and that there was ‘no basis of caste in Islam’ (Sahay, 2003). There is a slight contradiction here. If Dr.Ejaz Ali accepts the Islamic teaching that there is no basis for caste in Islam, on what grounds then does he talk about a ‘lower caste’ Muslim and consequently, reservations for them?
While there is no denying the fact that the despicable custom of discrimination on the basis of a person’s birth is prevalent in the Muslims of India, demanding a separate identity and other benefits based on caste is no panacea for this iniquity. This move is fraught with great danger. It will only end up providing another dimension to the already existing divisions within the community. Aren’t schisms based on Shi’a-Sunni, Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-i-Hadith, Jamaat-i-Islami etc., enough that we are now seeking to create categories like ‘dalit Muslim’ and ‘forward caste Muslim’? Matters have reached a position where an organisation called the All India United Muslim Morcha led by Dr.Ejaz Ali has gone ahead and proposed a unique ‘give-and-take’ formula for securing job reservations for Muslims while at the same time solving the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid tangle. Dr.Ali has proffered the handing over of the disputed land at Ayodhya to Hindus in return for removing religious restrictions from Article 341 of the Indian Constitution to include dalit Muslims in the scheduled caste category! It is a fact that all Muslims are looking for a lasting and peaceful solution for the Ayodhya problem, but this kind of ‘bargaining’ does nothing more than reflect the unreservedly myopic view that Dr.Ali and his supporters have with regard to the issue. From where does Dr.Ali derive the legitimacy of bartering away the sentiments of 130 million Muslims? What if after this ‘deal’ the VHP demands Mathura and Kashi?
A duplication of the social stratification based on caste being practised by the Hindu community of India, is the last thing that the Muslims of India need. History has great lessons for us. The V.P.Singh government implemented the proposals of the Mandal Commission, which recommended reservations in government jobs and educational institutions based on caste. This was followed by large-scale pro and anti-Mandal demonstrations all over the country, largely involving the student community. While the reservations provided succour to many belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, it also sharpened the already existing divide between the caste Hindus and dalits This was so because many persons belonging to upper castes, who could qualify only based on merit, felt that the reservations had further reduced their chances of securing jobs or seats in educational institutions.(3) The animosity, fuelled by centuries of discrimination faced by dalits and the recent reservation policy where the caste Hindus felt short-changed, is quite visible even to the undiscerning eye.
Now lets look at a hypothetical situation where the reservation system is replicated within the Muslim community of India. To begin with castes that deserve to be categorised as ‘dalit Muslims’ need to be identified. This process, in my opinion, would present a scenario where a set of Muslims, especially those coming from south India would either say that they are not ‘dalit Muslims’ or would express their inability to identify the caste they belong to for the simple reason that they don’t have a caste. A few other perplexing situations would be thrown up. How would, for example, a Muslim from Kerala with no caste, react to his fellow ‘dalit Muslim’ from Bihar getting a job based on his caste? It would be nothing short of a shock for the Malayalee Muslim who shares his reverence for Allah, his Friday namaz, and belief in Islamic tenets with the Bihari Muslim but still finds that he is different from him (the Bihari Muslim) because he doesn’t have a ‘caste’ – something which has no religious sanction at all! But most importantly, it would become the cause of much heartburn for those ‘casteless’ and so-called ‘non-dalit’ sections of the Muslim community, who would be ineligible to use the benefits of the reservation policy, as they do not meet the caste criteria laid down to avail this privilege. Assuming that caste based reservation is extended to Muslims too, it is bound to cause further fragmentation within the community.
Conclusion:
The bitter truth that the community needs to square up to is that caste stratification, howsoever blasphemous, is a reality of the Muslim society in India. This obnoxious practice cannot be wished away. The community has to set its face against it and the only way to fight this inhuman practice is direct action – a jihad against anyone practising, promoting or legitimising caste-based stratification. It is here that organisations like the Jamaat-i-’Ulama, Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat are required to intervene and undertake awareness programmes aimed at breaking through not just the primitive mindsets but also the social barriers created in the name of caste. The ‘ulama and madaris have to play their part in enlightening the Muslim masses about the ‘un-Islamicness’ of caste system being practised by them. Theirs is the voice most keenly heard in areas where this practice exists in reality. The dichotomy between the extreme egalitarianism advocated by the Holy Quran and its practice by Muslims of India needs to be emphasised. Moreover, this state of affairs is not only un-Islamic but also detrimental to the prosperity and security of the Muslim community in India. These fears are very real. Under these circumstances, the response of the Muslim community of India to this test should be one that reflects its maturity and age; a response that exhibits the collective wisdom of the community and the noble teachings of the Holy Quran and the Prophet (pbuh).
A common refrain heard from many quarters of the Muslim community in India is: ‘Islam khatre mein hai’ (Islam is in danger). Amazingly the danger to Islam is more from its followers than its detractors. Muslims who have strayed from the path of Islam and failed to comprehend its essence are proving to be the real threat to Islam. The Muslims of India have gained the dubious distinction of sustaining a highly prejudiced and devious system of social stratification, which is nowhere to be found in the rest of the Muslim world. The community would do itself a great favour by purging this evil from within its character.
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1. The region called Malabar, also the south-west coast in Kerala, is an Indianised form of ma’bar which in Arabic means passage. Since the Arab traders passed through that region often, it came to be known by that name.
2. The rediff.com reported incidents of backward or lower caste Muslims being denied entry for burial in graveyards by the upper caste Muslims forcing the lower caste Muslims to bury their dead outside the graveyard!
3. Interestingly it is not just caste Hindus who feel affected by the reservation policy. There is no separate criteria within the reservation system to treat Christians and Muslims who do not have castes. The fact that a lot of Christians and Muslims come from extremely poor backgrounds, sometimes even lower than dalits, does nothing to change their fortunes. They have to compete in the ‘open category.’ It is in situations like these that a review (perhaps at the risk of starting a civil war in the country) of the caste based reservation policy becomes imperative; a reservation based on economic criteria seems a more just solution.
REFERENCES
Ahmad, Imtiaz (ed) (1973). Caste and Social Stratification among the Muslims. Delhi. Manohar
Alam, Anwar (2003). Democratisation of Indian Muslims. Economic and Political Weekly, XXXVIII (46) November 15.
Anwar, Ali (2001) Masawat ki Jung: Pasemanzar: Bihar ka Pasmanda Musalman (in Hindi). New Delhi. Vani Prakashan.
Bahauddin, K.M. (1992) Kerala Muslims – the long struggle. Kottyam. Sahitya Pravarthaka Co-op society.
Diwan, Paras (1979) Constitution of India. New Delhi. Sterling Publishers.
Kurup, K.K.N. (1991) The Sufis and religious harmony in Kerala. in A.A.Engineer (ed) Sufism and Communal Harmony. Jaipur. Printwell
Lal, K.S. (1984). Early Muslims in India. New Delhi. Books and Books.
Sahay, Anand Mohan (2003, March 6). Backward Muslims protest denial of burial. News report in www.rediff.com. Retrieved on October 30 2003, from http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/06bihar.htm
Sikand, Yoginder (2003). The ‘Dalit-Muslims’ and the All India Backward Muslim Morcha. Qalandar, September. Retrieved November 12 2003, from http://www.islaminterfaith.org/sep2003/article.html
Salil Kader is Doctoral Researcher, Department of History,University of Hyderabad. He can be contacted at indikad75@rediffmail.com
Islam And Caste Inequality
Among Indian Muslims
By Yoginder Sikand
countercurrents.org
15 February, 200
Although the Qur’an insists on the radical equality of all Muslims, caste (zat, jati, biraderi) remains a defining feature of Indian Muslim society, with significant regional variations. While the severity of caste among the Indian Muslims is hardly as acute as among the Hindus, with the practice of untouchability being virtually absent, caste and associated notions of caste-based superiority and inferiority still do play an important role in Indian Muslim society. In most parts of India, Muslim society is based on the existence of numerous endogamous and generally occupationally specific caste groups, that have their own caste appellations. This disjunction between Qur’anic egalitarianism and Indian Muslim social practice has been theorized by Muslim scholars in different ways. While some have sought to reconcile the two by interpreting the scripturalist sources of Islam to support social hierarchy, others have pointed out that the continued existence of caste-like features in Indian Muslim society is a flagrant violation of the Qur’anic worldview.
Most studies of caste in India deal with the classical Hindu caste system or with its present forms among the Hindus. Since caste is the basis of the Hindu social order and is written into the Brahminical texts, studies of caste have been largely Hindu-centric. Following from this, the existence of caste-like features among non-Hindu, including Muslim, communities in India is thus generally seen as a result of the cultural influence on these communities of their Hindu neighbours or of Hinduism itself. This claim is based on the untenable assumption of a once pure, radically egalitarian Muslim community in India later coming under the baneful impact of Hinduism. However, as several studies on caste among the Indian Muslims have shown, while the influence of Hindu social mores on the Muslims might partially explain the continued salience of caste among them it does not fully explain how the Muslims of the region came to be stratified on the basis of caste in the first place. It also ignores the role of sections of the ‘ulama, scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, in providing religious legitimacy to caste with the help of the concept of kafa’a.
This article begins with a brief note on caste among the Indian Muslims, seeking to provide an explanation of the phenomenon based on the historical evolution of the Muslim community in India. It then looks at how, through the notion of kafa’a, caste and caste-based social hierarchy were sought to be accepted as normative and binding by important sections of the ‘ulama. Through an examination of a text penned by a contemporary Indian Muslim scholar it then provides a critique of widely-held notions of kafa’a and caste based on the principle of Qur’anic egalitarianism.
Caste Among the Indian Muslims
The vast majority of the Indian Muslims are descendants of converts from what is today called ‘Hinduism’. Individual conversions to Islam in medieval times were rare. Rather, typically, entire local caste groups or significant sections thereof underwent a gradual process of Islamisation, in the course of which elements of the Islamic faith were gradually incorporated into local cosmologies and ritual practice while gradually displacing or replacing local or ‘Hindu’ elements. In other words, conversion was both a social as well as a gradual process. Because it was a collective social process, the original endogamous circle prior to conversion was still preserved even after the group undergoing the process had witnessed a significant degree of cultural change. Hence, even after conversion to Islam marriage continued to take place within the original caste group. This is how Muslim society came to be characterized by the existence of multiple endogamous caste-like groups. Because mass
conversion to Islam was also rarely, if ever, a sudden event, but, rather, generally took the form of a gradual process of cultural change, often extending over generations, many of the converts retained several of their local, pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. It was thus not the influence of Hinduism among a previously ‘pure’, ‘uncontaminated’ Muslim community as such, but, rather, the continued impact of Hindu beliefs and customs on the converts who still remained within a largely Hindu cultural universe and retained many of its associated beliefs and practices, that explains the continued hold of caste-related practices and assumptions among large sections of the Indian Muslim community.
The Ashraf-Ajlaf Divide
Scholarly writings on caste among Indian Muslims generally note the division that is often made between the so-called ‘noble’ castes or ashraf and those labeled as inferior, or razil, kamin or ajlaf. The ashraf-ajlaf division is not the invention of modern social scientists, for it is repeatedly mentioned in medieval works of ashraf scholars themselves. To these writers, Muslims of Arab, Central Asian, Iranian and Afghan extraction were superior in social status than local converts. This owed not just to racial differences, with local converts generally being dark-skinned and the ashraf lighter complexioned, but also to the fact that the ashraf belonged to the dominant political elites, while the bulk of the ajlaf remained associated with ancestral professions as artisans and peasants which were looked down upon as inferior and demeaning.
In order to provide suitable legitimacy to their claims of social superiority, medieval Indian ashraf scholars wrote numerous texts that sought to interpret the Qur’an to suit their purposes, thus effectively denying the Qur’an’s message of radical social equality. Pre-Islamic Persian notions of the divine right of kings and the nobility, as opposed to the actual practice of the Prophet and the early Muslim community, seem to have exercised a powerful influence on these writers. A classical, oft-quoted example in this regard is provided by the Fatawa-i Jahandari, written by the fourteenth century Turkish scholar, Ziauddin Barani, a leading courtier of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, Sultan of Delhi. This text is the only known surviving Indo-Persian treatise exclusively devoted to political theory from the period of the Delhi Sultanate.
The Fatawa-i Jahandari shows Barani as a fervent champion of ashraf supremacy and as vehemently opposed to the ajlaf. In appealing to the Sultan to protect the ashraf and keep the ajlaf firmly under their control and submission he repeatedly refers to the Qur’an, from which he seeks to derive legitimacy from his arguments. His is not a rigorous scholarly approach to the Qur’an, however, for he conveniently misinterprets it to support the hegemonic claims of the ashraf, completely ignoring the Qur’an’s insistence on social equality. In the process, he develops a doctrine and social vision for the ideal Muslim ruler, which, in their implications for what Barani calls the ‘low-born’, are hardly different in their severity than the classical Hindu law of caste as contained in the Manusmriti, the Brahminical law code. As Barani’s translator, Mohammad Habib, writes, ‘Barani’s God, as is quite clear from his work, has two aspects-first, he is the tribal deity of the Musalmans; secondly, as
between the Musalmans themselves, He is the tribal deity of well-born Muslims’.[1] Barani was not a lone voice in his period, however, for he seems to echo a widely shared understanding of ashraf supremacy held by many of his ashraf contemporaries, including leading ‘ulama and Sufis.
Barani’s disdain for the ‘low’ born is well illustrated in his advice to the Sultan about education of the ajlaf. While the Qur’an and the traditions attributed to the Prophet repeatedly stress the need for all Muslims, men and women, rich and poor, to acquire knowledge, Barani insists that the Sultan should consider it his religious duty to deny the ajlaf access to knowledge, branding them as ‘mean’, and ‘despicable’. Thus, he advises the Sultan:
Teachers of every kind are to be sternly ordered not to thrust precious stones down the throats of dogs or to put collars of gold round the necks of pigs and bears-that is, to the mean, the ignoble and the worthless, to shopkeepers and to the low-born they are to teach nothing more than the rules about prayer, fasting, religious charity and the haj pilgrimage, along with some chapters of the Qur’an and some doctrines of the faith, without which their religion cannot be correct and valid prayers are not possible. But they are to be taught nothing else, lest it bring honour to their mean souls.[2]
As Barani sees it, if the ajlaf were allowed access to education, they might challenge ashraf hegemony. Therefore, he sternly warns the Sultan:
They are not to be taught reading and writing, for plenty of disorders arise owing to the skill of the low born in knowledge. The disorder into which all affairs of the religion and the state are thrown is due to the acts and words of the low born, who have become skilled. For, on account of their skill, they become governors (wali), revenue-collectors (‘amils), auditors (mutassarif), officers (farman deh) and rulers (farman rawa). If teachers are disobedient, and it is discovered at the time of investigation that they have imparted knowledge or taught letters or writing to the low born, inevitably the punishment for their disobedience will be meted out to them.[3]
In order to bolster his assertion that the Sultan should ensure that the ajlaf remain subservient to the ashraf, Barani seeks appropriate religious sanction. Thus, he asserts:
[.] to promote base, mean, low-born and worthless men to be the helpers and supporters of the government has not been permitted by any religion, creed, publicly accepted tradition or state-law.[4]
He then goes on to elaborate a theory of the innate inferiority of the ajlaf, the superiority of the ashraf and the divine right of the Sultan to rule, based on a distorted interpretation of Islam. Thus, he writes that the ‘merits’ and ‘demerits’ of all people have been ‘apportioned at the beginning of time and allotted to their souls’. Hence, people’s acts are not of their own volition, but, rather, an expression and result of of ‘Divine commandments’. God Himself, Barani claims, has decided that the ajlaf be confined to ‘inferior’ occupations, for He is said to have made them ‘low born, bazaar people, base, mean, worthless, plebian, shameless and of dirty birth’. God has given them ‘base’ qualities, such as ‘immodesty, wrongfulness, injustice, cruelty, non-recognition of rights, shamelessness, impudence, blood-shedding, rascality, jugglery and Godlessness’ that are suitable only for such professions. Furthermore, these base qualities are inherited from father to son, and so the
ajlaf must not attempt to take up professions reserved by God for the ashraf even if they are qualified to do so, for this would be a grave violation of the Divine Will. Likewise, Barani claims, God has bestowed the ashraf with noble virtues by birth itself, and these are transmitted hereditarily. Hence, they alone have the right and responsibility of taking up ‘noble’ occupations, such as ruling, teaching and preaching the faith.[5]
Since God is held to have made the ajlaf innately despicable and base, to promote them would be a gross violation of the divine plan. ‘In the promotion of the low and low-born brings’, Barani argues, ‘ there is no advantage in this world, for it is impudent to act against the wisdom of Creation’. Hence, he insists that if the Sultan confers any post in his court or government service to the ajlaf, the ‘court and the high position of the king will be disgraced, the people of God will be distressed and scattered, the objectives of the government will not be attained, and, finally, the king will be punished on the day of Judgment’. In this regard, he refers to a tradition attributed to the Prophet, according to which Muhammad is said to have declared, ‘The vein is deceptive’. Although this tradition might be interpreted to suggest that one’s social status does not depend on one’s heredity, Barani offers a novel explanation of the tradition to suggest precisely the opposite conclusion,
that ‘the good vein and the bad vein draw towards virtue and vice’, and that ‘in the well-born and the noble only virtue and loyalty appear, while from the man of low birth and bad birth only wickedness and destruction originate’. Likewise, he provides a novel interpretation of a Qur’anic verse (xlix: 13) to support his claim of ashraf superiority. He quotes the Qur’an as saying that God honours the pious, a statement that has generally been read to suggest that superiority in God’s eyes depends on one’s piety and not birth, to arrive at precisely the opposite conclusion. The verse, he says, implies that ‘[.] it ought to be known that in the impure and impure-born and low and low-born, there can be no piety’.[6]
As Barani’s writings on the ajlaf so clearly suggest, many medieval ashraf scholars shared a common understanding of the ‘low-born’ as born to serve the ashraf. Accordingly, to leigitimize this claim they interpreted the Qur’an as sanctioning a sternly hierarchical social order, with the subordinate status of the ajlaf ascribed to the Divine Will. As H.N.Ansari, a contemporary Indian Muslim scholar and an activist of a ‘low’ caste Muslim organization, remarks, this represented a profoundly ‘un-Islamic’ reading of the Qur’an, which stresses the equality of all Muslims and lays down piety as the only criterion for merit in God’s eyes. Yet, Ansari adds, men like Barani exercised a powerful influence in their times with their wrong interpretations of the Qur’an, resulting in the ‘complete betrayal of the Qur’anic precepts of brotherhood’.[7]
To imagine, as some writers today assert, a solidly egalitarian Muslim community pitted against a sternly hierarchical Hindu community in medieval India is thus hardly convincing. Nor, for that matter, is the explanation of the existence of caste and social hierarchy among Muslims as a result of the baneful impact of hierarchical Hinduism on egalitarian Islam. Although the impact of the wider Hindu society on the beliefs and practices of the Muslims is obvious, in the face of hierarchical notions of religion and the normative social order as reflected in the writings of Barani, it is obvious that the Muslim elite played an equally central role in promoting and preserving social hierarchy by seeking to provide it with suitable ‘Islamic’ sanction. The effort to legitimize caste in ‘Islamic’ terms was given further impetus by the ‘ulama through the notion of kafa’a, to which we now turn.
Kafa’a and the Legitimisation of Caste by the Indian ‘Ulama
The Qur’an and the genuine Prophetic traditions consider Muslims as equals, and hence allow for any Muslim to marry a suitable Muslim spouse. In deciding an ideal marriage partner the Qur’an suggests the criteria of piety (taqwa) and faith (iman), regarding these, rather than birth or wealth, as the only mark of a person’s nearness to God. It is clear from the records of the Prophet and his companions that this principle was actually acted upon. Thus, for instance, we hear of instances of slave men or recently freed slaves marrying free women with the Prophet’s consent.
Over time, however, as Islam spread to new regions outside the confines of the Arabian peninsula, the early egalitarian Muslim society was transformed into a complex, sharply hierarchical social order. This owed to several factors, including the ‘feudalisation’ of Islam accompanying the emergence of the Ummayad empire; the incorporation of non-Arab groups as subordinate ‘clients’ (mawali) of ruling Arab tribes; and the impact of other cultures, particularly Greek and Persian, in which social hierarchies were already deeply entrenched. These developments exercised a propound influence on the emerging schools of Islamic law (mazahib). As a result, notions of social hierarchy based on birth that were foreign to the Qur’an and to the early Muslim community were gradually incorporated into the corpus of writings of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh.
One manifestation of this was the central importance that the fuqaha or scholars of the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence now began paying to the notion of equality of status in matters of marriage or kafa’a. Elaborate rules were constructed built on the notion of kafa’a that specified the ‘equals’ whom one could legitimately marry. Taking a spouse from outside one’s kafa’a was sternly frowned upon, if not explicitly forbidden by the fuqaha. In the face of Qur’anic and genuine Prophetic traditions that stressed that the only basis for selecting one’s marital partner was piety, the scripturalist sources of Islam were suitably misinterpreted to provide legitimacy for notions of kafa’a based on wealth and birth, including ethnicity.
These debates on kafa’a have a direct bearing on how the Indian Muslim ‘ulama have looked at the question of caste, caste endogamy and inter-caste relations. Since the vast majority of the Indian Muslims follow the Hanafi school, the opinions of the classical Hanafi ‘ulama on kafa’a continue to determine the attitudes of the Indian ‘ulama on the question of caste and social hierarchy. Most Indian Hanafis seem to have regarded caste (biraderi), understood here as hereditary occupational group, as an essential factor in deciding kafa’a, and in this way have provided fiqh legitimacy to the notion of caste.
The detailed debates among the fuqaha of the law schools about kafa’a need not detain us here, and it is sufficient to mention that they differed somewhat on the criterion for deciding it. ‘Abdul Hamid Nu’mani, a contemporary Indian Muslim scholar, writes that many classical fuqaha considered the following issues to decide one’s kafa’a for purposes of marriage: legal status as free or enslaved (azadi); economic status (maldari); occupation (pesha); intelligence (‘aql); family origin or ethnicity (nasb); absence of bodily defects and illness; and, finally, piety (taqwa).[8] All these are said to have been deciding factors for kafa’a for the Hanafis and the Hanbalis, while according to Imam Malik, the real basis of kafa’a is said to have been piety. Imam Shafi’ is said not to have included wealth in kafa’a. On the whole, however, most fuqaha insisted on taking factors other than simply piety in deciding kafa’a.[9] In the Indian context, this expanded notion of kafa’a, representing a
considerable departure from the Qur’an, was accepted as laying down the norms for deciding on the legality of a Muslim marriage. By restricting marriage to one’s occupational and ethnic group, caste, which is, in theory, an endogamous birth-based occupational category, came to be regarded as essential to establishing kafa’a for purposes of marriage. In this way, the notion of kafa’a helped to provide legitimacy to the existence of caste among the Indian Muslims by effectively restricting marriage within the endogamous caste circle. This is readily apparent even in the fatwa literature produced by several recent Indian ‘ulama, an issue that we now look at.
To illustrate the ways in which significant sections of the Indian ‘ulama have sought to employ the concept of kafa’a to legitimize caste and social inequality I focus here on a slim Urdu tract on the subject penned by a contemporary Indian Muslim scholar, Maulana ‘Abdul Hamid Nu’mani. A senior leader of the Jami’at ul-’Ulama-i Hind (‘The Union of the ‘Ulama of India), Nu’mani belongs to the Ansari caste of hereditary weavers, traditionally considered by ashraf Muslims as ‘low’ in social status. His tract is a modified version of a speech that he delivered in 1994 at the request of the Anjuman Khuddam al-Qur’an, a Muslim missionary organization based at the town of Vaniyambadi in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The Anjuman had invited him to deliver a lecture on the subject of Islamic mission (tabligh) and the question of kafa’a, for the Anjuman had itself discovered that one of the major hurdles in its missionary outreach work among the low-caste Hindus of the area was that while the converts were readily accepted as religious equals by other Muslims, the latter were unwilling, on grounds of kafa’a, to intermarry with them. For the Anjuman, this problem appeared as a central concern for, by making the life of the converts difficult, it made conversion to Islam an unviable option for many. Accordingly, in order to clarify the ‘true’ Islamic perspective on kafa’a and to oppose notions of kafa’a that legitimize caste and social inequality, the Anjuman requested Nu’mani to deliver a scholarly paper on the subject in the light of the teachings of the Qur’an. The speech was apparently very well received, and was shortly published as a booklet, suitably titled Masla-i Kufw Aur Isha’at-i Islam (‘The Problem of Kafa’a and the Spread of Islam’).
Nu’mani beings his tract by arguing that the single most important factor for the spread of Islam in India was the Qur’an’s message of radical social equality (masavat) and respect for all humankind (ihtiram-i admiyat). This naturally appealed most to the downtrodden ‘low’ castes who were sternly oppressed by the Brahminical religion and the caste system on which it was based. The Sufis who propagated Islam among the ‘low’ castes are said to have been seriously committed to their welfare, but because their scale of work was so immense they were unable to properly tend to the proper Islamic instruction of their neophytes. Therefore, Nu’mani says, the converts retained several of their pre-Islamic beliefs and practices, including notions of caste. Further, he writes, caste and related concepts of birth-based ritual status were given added legitimacy by Muslim rulers and missionaries who had come to India from the lands of ‘ajam, Iran, Turkey and Central Asia, where concepts of social inequality were already well entrenched.[10]
Nu’mani quotes extensively from Barani’s Fatawa-i Jahandari to show how discriminatory attitudes towards low-caste converts were widely shared by medieval Muslim elites. He also comments on the absence of any effective opposition to such views. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that, ‘From Barani’s time till 1947 the notion of Muslim society being divided into ashraf and ajlaf, high and low, was continuously present’. He refers to some twentieth century Indian ‘ulama of his own Deobandi school as opposing caste-based inequality among the Indian Muslims but laments that ‘this sickness has not as yet been fully eliminated’. He admits that although the caste system is less severe among the Muslims than it is among the Hindus, in that untouchability is absent among the former, with caste playing a determining role only in marriage among Muslims. Yet, he pleads for Muslims to combat notions of caste based superiority and inferiority, for only then, he argues, can efforts to spread Islam among ‘low’ caste Hindus be effective. For this purpose, he says, a radical revisioning of the concept of kafa’a is urgently required.[11]
The remainder of the text consists of an elaborate discussion of the notion of kafa’a. In the process of developing a Qur’anic notion of kafa’a, Nu’mani surveys notions of kafa’a as developed by the classical fuqaha and further elaborated upon by various Indian ‘ulama. Since his concern is to revive the original Qur’anic notion of kafa’a, which alone he sees as normative and binding, he engages in a process of ijtihad (although he does not refer to it as such), refusing to remain tied down by formulations of kafa’a as contained in the corpus of fiqh, including of the Hanafi school with which he is associated. In evoking what he calls the true Islamic position on kafa’a, he has four broad objectives. Firstly, to revive the original message of radical social equality of the Qur’an which he sees many later ‘ulama as having distorted, willfully or otherwise. Secondly, to combat caste-based divisions among the Muslims and thereby to promote Muslim unity. Thirdly, to disprove claims of
critics that Islam is not an egalitarian religion and that, therefore, it cannot provide equality to ‘low’ caste Hindu converts. Finally, to provide an understanding of kafa’a that, being liberated from notions of caste, can help in integrating converts into the mainstream of Muslim society through inter-marriage and thereby remove a major hurdle in the path of Muslim missionary work, particularly among ‘low’ caste Hindus.
In doing so, Nu’mani has to deal with reports attributed to the Prophet and some of his close companions that seem to legitimize social inequality, as well as the writings of the classical fuqaha on the subject of kafa’a. As regards certain hadith which seem to promote discriminatory attitudes towards people who follow certain ‘low’ professions, Nu’mani subjects the lines of transmission (isnad) as well as content (matn) of these reports to close scrutiny, concluding that they are fabricated. He explains some statements by the companions of the Prophet that militate against social equality by reading them contextually, and hence argues that they are not applicable for all time. On the restrictive provisions related to kafa’a that the fuqaha have prescribed, Nu’mani insists that the Qur’an and the genuine Hadith should be the sole criterion for judging them. Since the corpus of fiqh is a post-Qur’anic development, and since the fuqaha were mere mortals, although they might have been well intentioned, Nu’mani suggests that Muslims should not blindly follow their prescriptions if they violate the Qur’an and the genuine Hadith. However, rather than opposing the opinions of the fuqaha directly he points to the differences between the different schools of fiqh, and within each school the varying opinions of different fuqaha, on the question of kafa’a, highlighting those views that support his own radically egalitarian understanding of kafa’a.
After providing a brief note on the varying definitions of kafa’a in different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Nu’mani writes that according to the Qur’an, kafa’a is based only on piety. Hence, the only criterion for deciding a marriage partner should, ideally, be his or her personal character and dedication to the faith. In other words, he suggests, there is no religious bar for a Muslim man from a low caste or a low caste Hindu convert to Islam to marry a Muslim girl from a high caste or vice versa. This, of course, goes completely against dominant notions of kafa’a. Nu’mani does not openly question the schools of fiqh as such. Rather, he points to possibilities within the existing schools and to differences among the fuqaha of the different schools as well as within each school to press his claim for an egalitarian reading of kafa’a.
In arguing the case for an egalitarian interpretation of kafa’a Nu’mani has to contend with traditions that have been used by many scholars to insist on the need for people to marry within their same social class. He does not deny the veracity of such claims but interprets them in a novel way to bolster his argument that cross-class marriages are to be regarded as legitimate as well. Thus, for instance, he refers to a tradition according to which the third caliph, ‘Umar, refused to let a girl from a rich family to marry a man from a lower class. Nu’mani does not say that the caliph was wrong in his pronouncement. Rather, he says, his opinion was correct because it might be difficult for such a girl to live in poor family without the comforts to which she was used to before marriage. Hence, for marital compatibility a rough equality of economic status is indeed preferable. However, Nu’mani argues, this does not mean that a girl from a rich family cannot marry a poor man or that
equality in economic status is an absolute necessity in marriage.[12] Nu’mani recognizes that rough equality of economic status is preferable in marriage partners, but insists that it is not absolutely essential. To use ‘Umar’s decision to argue the case that marriage must take place only within one’s social class or caste, is therefore, untenable. Nu’mani here quotes another, conflicting report attributed to ‘Umar, according to which the caliph declared that in deciding a man’s marriage partner he did not consider her ethnic or economic status.[13]
Likewise, on the question of occupation (pesha) in determining kafa’a, Nu’mani writes that many ‘ulama have adopted what he calls an ‘unnecessarily restrictive’ attitude, which has led to notions of caste superiority and inferiority since caste is, in theory, also an occupational category. Nu’mani remarks that this is particularly unfortunate, given that Imam Abu Hanifa, whose school of jurisprudence most Indian Muslims claim to follow, did not himself consider occupation as a factor in determining kafa’a. This is because one’s occupation does not always remain the same and can, in theory, change. Nu’mani also refers to some Hanafi jurists who placed knowledge (‘ilm) above profession in deciding kafa’a, thereby allowing a learned Muslim from a family following a ‘low’ profession to marry a woman from a ‘respectable’ family.[14] On the other hand, Nu’mani notes that some Hanafi ‘ulama, including Imam Abu Yusuf, a student of Abu Hanifa, did include occupation in deciding kafa’a, going
so far as to single out the profession of weavers, barbers and tailors as ‘despicable’. On the basis of this, Nu’mani says, numerous Hanafi ‘ulama have issued fatwas declaring weavers, barbers and tailors to be outside the kafa’a of those who pursue other, more ‘respectable’, professions.[15] He notes that some fuqaha have adopted a somewhat less severe position on the matter by declaring that if a weaver gives up his profession and takes to trade, then he can be considered the kafa’a of a trader and can marry a trader’s daughter. Not all Hanafi ‘ulama were ready to provide this concession, however. Nu’mani refers to Ibn Najim who opined that even if a person were to abandon a ‘low’ profession he would not be able to remove the ‘stains’ that, allegedly, inevitably form on his character from such an occupation and hence he cannot be considered as the kafa’a of a person from a family that follows a ‘respectable’ profession. Closer to our times, Nu’mani notes, Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921), the founder of the Barelwi school, is said to have declared that weavers, cobblers and barbers, even if learned in religion, could not be considered the kafa’a of those following ‘respectable’ professions.[16] Hence, Nu’mani remarks, the notion that one should not marry outside one’s occupational group, which in India is generally the caste group, is widely accepted by many Indian Hanafi ‘ulama.
In discussing the Hanafi position on kafa’a being determined, among other factors, by one’s profession, Nu’mani writes that Hanafi ‘ulama have resorted to two sources to legitimize their argument. Firstly, popular custom or ‘urf. By regarding caste-based occupation as a legitimate ‘urf they have sought to incorporate it into the corpus of fiqh. This, however, says Nu’mani, is a gross violation of Islam and ‘a conscious or unconscious imitation of the Indian Brahminical social system’.[17] The other source that the fuqaha have invoked to support their claim of kafa’a being dependent on occupation is a single hadith attributed to the Prophet. According to this narration, the Prophet is said to have declared that weavers and barbers are not to be considered as the kafa’a of others. This means, therefore, that weavers and barbers cannot marry people who belong to families that follow other professions. Nu’mani remarks that this hadith is ‘very weak’ (intihai za’if) and adds that numerous
scholars of Hadith have argued that it is a later fabrication wrongly attributed to the Prophet. How could the Prophet, who is considered as a source of mercy for all, consider any members of his community as despicable simply because they were weavers or barbers, Num’ani asks.[18] Indirectly critiquing these anti-egalitarian reports, Nu’mani here refers to several prophets before Muhammad as well as numerous companions of Muhammad who engaged in occupations that some later fuqaha wrongly described as ‘low’. Thus, he notes that the prophet David was an artisan and that numerous companions of Muhammad were weavers and carpenters.[19]
Nu’mani writes that all legitimate (halal, jai’z) occupations are noble and praise-worthy in God’s eyes, and hence to claim that weaving, barbering and other such trades are ‘despicable’ as some fuqaha have done, is completely against basic Islamic teachings. Therefore, he argues, from a strictly Qur’anic perspective, a person pursuing any legitimate profession may be considered the kafa’a of any other similar person for purposes of marriage. In this regard he quotes Mufti Kifayatullah, a leading Indian Deobandi scholar, whom he singles out as one of the few Indian ‘ulama to have taken a correct position on kafa’a, as having declared in a fatwa that ‘To consider someone inferior simply because he follows a legitimate is profession is opposed to the teachings of Islam’.[20] In approvingly quoting Mufti Kifayatullah here Nu’mani does not deny that several other leading Deobandi scholars, such as Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Mufti Muhammad Shafi, had adopted a divergent stance by supporting
the dominant Hanafi position on kafa’a as being determined, among other factors, by occupation. He also admits that Thanwi had gone so far as to declare weavers and oil-pressers as ‘low’ castes. Yet, he claims, in contrast to their Barelwi opponents, the Deobandi ‘ulama have never hesitated to correct each other’s views. [21]Indeed, he does this himself explicitly in critiquing the views of his fellow Deobandis, renowned ‘ulama such as Thanwi and Shafi, on the matter of kafa’a.
Family, tribe or ethnic group (nasb) have also been considered by several classical fuqaha as well as Indian ‘ulama as an essential basis for deciding kafa’a. Yet, Nu’mani writes, not one of the several traditions attributed to the Prophet that have been adduced for this purpose have been proved to be fully genuine (sahih). They are all said to be ‘very weak’ and even ‘fabricated’ (mauzu). Nu’mani examines five traditions attributed to the Prophet that are generally used to argue the case for nasb to be included in kafa’a. All of them, he contends, are fabricated, have weak chains of narration (isnad) or else do not have any direct bearing on the question of nasb in marriage. To illustrate his argument, he focuses on one particular tradition, according to which the Prophet is said to have laid down that all members of his Qur’aish clan are of the same kafa’a; that all Arabs belong to the same kafa’a; that members of one tribe are the kafa’a of each other; and that all people are of
the same kafa’a except for weavers and barbers.[22] Like other similar reports, this one, too, Nu’mani claims, is not to be regarded as absolutely authentic for it has a weak narrative chain. Indeed, several Islamic scholars have insisted that it is ‘completely fabricated’.[23] This report is said also to completely contradict the teachings of the Qur’an, the genuine prophetic traditions and the practice of the companions of the Prophet, and, for that additional reason, is not to be regarded as authentic. The Qur’an repeatedly stresses that all Muslims are equal, and one such Qur’anic verse, Nu’mani writes, is said to have been specifically revealed to the Prophet to refute the belief that people should marry only within their own tribe.[24] Likewise, numerous genuine Prophetic traditions are said to directly oppose the belief in nasb being essential to kafa’a. Thus, several companions of the Prophet are said to have married outside their tribe with the Prophet’s consent. The
Prophet advised one of his followers, an Ansar from Medina, to give his daughter in marriage to one of his closest companions, Bilal, a freed black slave. Abu Bakr, the first caliph, accepted the marriage proposal of Salman Farsi, a Persian companion of the Prophet, to marry his daughter. All this very clearly proves, Nu’mani writes, that it is indeed legitimate to marry outside one’s ethnic group or caste and that the bar on such marriages placed by numerous fuqaha is not Islamic.
Despite the clear evidence in the Qur’an and the Hadith that nasb is not to be included in kafa’a, Nu’mani notes that several fuqaha have expressed contrary opinions. However, he writes that there is no complete consensus among the fuqaha on the matter. Thus, Imam Malik as well as some Hanafi ‘ulama did not include nasb in establishing kafa’a, while Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Shafi’ did so.[25] There are conflicting views on Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s opinion. According to one report he ignored nasb in establishing kafa’a, while according to another report he regarded all Arabs as being equal for marriage purposes, and all non-Arabs (‘ajamis) as equal, thus forbidding marriage between Arabs and non-Arabs. Nu’mani argues that those fuqaha who included nasb in kafa’a probably did so because of the particular social conditions prevailing at their time. However, he adds, because of the ‘unnecessary importance’ which the contemporary Indian ‘ulama give to nasb, ‘numerous social problems have been created’ and non-Muslims are ‘getting a wrong message’ about Islam. Hence, he appeals for ‘serious thinking’ on the matter of nasb in establishing kafa’a. A mark of the remarkable flexibility of Nu’mani’s approach to fiqh is his approval of the few Indian Hanafi ‘ulama who have adopted the position of Imam Malik on the question of nasb in kafa’a in their fatwas instead of blindly following the dominant Hanafi position.[26]
Further on the question of linking nasb to kafa’a, Nu’mani deals with the distinction that many Hanafi scholars have established between old Muslims (jadid al-islam musalman) and new Muslims (jadid al-Islam musalman), and arguing that the two may not intermarry because they are not the kafa’a of each other. According to these scholars, a man who converts to Islam cannot marry a woman who was born to a Muslim father. The son of a convert to Islam cannot marry a woman whose paternal grandfather and father were Muslims, but the grandson of a convert can marry a woman from an ‘old’ Muslim family. Accordingly, a convert to Islam can only marry a fellow convert. This holds true only for non-Arabs, there being no distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Muslims for Arabs.[27]
Nu’mani sees this restrictive provision as making life for converts to Islam even more difficult and, therefore, making conversion to Islam a difficult choice for non-Muslims. By making this distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Muslims, he says, ‘rather than welcoming our new guests we are insulting them’.[28] Accordingly, he fervently appeals to his fellow ‘ulama to relax or abandon this rule, which in any case he sees as having no sanction in Islam. He reminds them that because they insisted on this un-Islamic provision, a large group of Hindus of the Tyagi caste in northern India who were ready to convert to Islam finally decided not to because the Muslim Tyagis refused to intermarry with them on the grounds that ‘old’ Muslims could not establish marital relations with converts. Likewise, Nu’mani writes, it was because of the discriminatory and anti-Qur’anic rules that the ‘ulama have devised on kafa’a that Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the ‘low’ caste Dalits, declined to convert to
Islam, choosing Buddhism instead.[29]
Nu’mani admits that some of his fellow Deobandis have argued that ‘old’ and ‘new’ Muslims are not of the same kafa’a and so cannot intermarry. In addition, he notes that they have also argued that Muslims from different castes cannot marry on the grounds of not belonging to the same nasb. Yet, Nu’mani refuses to be bound by their views. In order to press his claim that nasb should not be regarded as an essential factor in determining kafa’a he points to alternate opinions within the broader Deobandi tradition. Thus, he refers to fatwas by such scholars Mufi Kifayatullah and Sayyed Sulaiman Nadwi asserting that nasb was not to be considered as essential component of kafa’a,[30] and that a convert could indeed marry into a family of ‘old’ Muslims on the grounds that all Muslims are equal.[31] Nu’mani notes the existence of what he calls ‘very weak’ prophetic traditions stressing nasb in kafa’a, but says that in their light ‘at the most’ what can be said is that it might be better to
marry within one’s ethnic group or caste (biraderi) than outside. However, he says, this clearly does not mean that marriage must only take place within one’s caste but only that marrying outside one’s caste is not disallowed by the shari’ah.[32] If marriage outside one’s caste were thus to be recognized, Nu’mani suggests that it would promote Muslim unity, help converts to Islam find spouses within the Muslim community, and counter the perception among non-Muslims’ of the existence of caste discrimination among Muslims.[33]
After reviewing the writings of the classical fuqaha and some influential twentieth century Indian Hanafi scholars on kafa’a being determined by wealth, occupation and ethnicity, Nu’mani writes that, notwithstanding their differences, all the schools of Sunni jurisprudence are agreed that piety should be a determining factor in deciding kafa’a in marriage. ‘It should not be’, he writes, ‘that a pious girl who regularly says her prayers and keeps her fasts should be married to a criminal’ simply because he belongs to the same ethnic or occupational group. He approvingly refers to some classical fuqaha who opined that the piety was to be the only determining factor in selecting a marriage partner. In order to further support his contention that piety alone should be the criterion for kafa’a he quotes a Prophetic tradition to the effect that a marriage proposal from a man of high morals should be accepted, otherwise it would lead to strife.[34] In another hadith the Prophet is said to
have warned against marrying a woman simply because of her beauty or wealth. Her good looks might lead her to evil ways, while her wealth might make her rebellious and proud. On the other hand, a pious black slave girl, Muhammad declared, made a much better marriage partner. Thus, Nu’mani concludes, the Qur’an and the genuine prophetic traditions clearly suggest that it is piety alone that should be basis of kafa’a, with other factors ‘having no real importance’.[35]
In effect, then, by subjecting the existing corpus of fiqh and the writings of the classical and later Indian ‘ulama to a critical reading, Nu’mani argues for the need to go back to the Qur’an and the genuine Prophetic traditions to develop a new fiqhi perspective on kafa’a and caste. By appealing to the radically egalitarian social ethics contained in the Qur’an and the genuine Prophetic traditions, by subjecting some traditions that seem to promote social inequality to a critical contextual reading, by dismissing anti-egalitarian traditions as inauthentic, and by pointing out the divergent views of the fuqaha and ‘ulama of different schools of jurisprudence and within each school on the matter of kafa’a, Nu’mani argues that piety alone should be considered as the essential basis of kafa’a. In this way, he critiques both the notion of caste as well as the arguments of the fuqaha who have sought to incorporate caste as a major factor in deciding kafa’a and thereby grant caste a
certain religious legitimacy.
Conclusion
As this paper has sought to show, although the Qur’an and the genuine Prophetic traditions suggest a radically egalitarian social vision, actual Muslim social practice, including in India, points to the existence of sharp social hierarchies that numerous Muslim scholars have sought to provide appropriate ‘Islamic’ sanction through elaborate rules of fiqh associated with the notion of kafa’a. This was further boosted by distorted interpretations of the Qur’an and the invention of reports attributed to the Prophet that sought to legitimize social inequality based on ethnicity and occupation. In the Indian context, numerous leading ‘ulama, almost all from the ‘high’ castes, have used these arguments to sanction caste and caste-based distinctions, particularly in matters of marriage. Yet, as Nu’mani’s case shows, today at least some Indian ‘ulama are willing to critically examine the corpus of medieval fiqh and seek inspiration and guidance directly from the Qur’an and the genuine
Prophetic traditions instead, in order to recover the original Islamic vision that is robustly opposed to social hierarchy determined by birth, the very basis of the caste system.
———————————
[1] Mohammad Habib & Afsar ‘Umar Salim Khan, The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate (Including a translation of Ziauddin Barani’s Fatawa-i Jahandari Circa 1358-9 A.D.), p.134.
[2] Ibid., p.49.
[3] Ibid., p.49.
[4] Ibid., p.95.
[5] Ibid., pp.97-8.
[6] Ibid., pp.97-8.
[7] H.N.Ansari, ‘Hindustani Musalmano Ki Samaji Darja Bandi’, in Ashfaq Husain Ansari, Pasmanda Musalmano Ke Masa’il’, Centre of Backward Muslims, Gorakhpur, n.d., p.25)
[8] ‘Abdul Hamid Nu’mani, Masla-i Kufw Aur Isha’at-i Islam, New Delhi: Qazi Publications, 2002, p.10.
[9] Ibid., p.10.
[10] Ibid., p.4.
[11] Ibid., pp.6-8.
[12] Ibid., p.27.
[13] Ibid., p.27.
[14] Ibid., p.17.
[15] Ibid., p.13.
[16] Ibid., p.17.
[17] Ibid., p.16.
[18] Ibid., p.15.
[19] Ibid., p.16.
[20] Ibid., p.16.
[21] Ibid., p.19.
[22] Ibid., p.25.
[23] Ibid., p.29.
[24] Ibid., p.30.
[25] Ibid., p.22.
[26] These ‘ulama include Mufti Kifayatullah, Sayyed Sulaiman Nadwi and Mufti Yasin, author of the Fatawa-i Ahya- ul-’Ulum (Ibid., p.23).
[27] Ibid., p.33.
[28] Ibid., p.36.
[29] Ibid., p.37.
[30] Ibid., p.23.
[31] Ibid., p.39.
[32] Ibid., p.24.
[33] Ibid., p.25.
[34] Ibid., p.20.
[35] Ibid., p.21.
M. N. Srinivas
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Mysore Narasimhachar Srinivas (Kannada: ಮೈಸೂರು ನರಸಿಂಹಚಾರ್ ಶ್ರೀನಿವಾಸ್) (1916–1999) was an Indian sociologist.[1] He is mostly known for his work on caste and caste systems, social stratification, Sanskritisation and Westernisation in southern India.
Career
Srinivas earned his doctorate in sociology from the University of Bombay and went on to the University of Oxford for further studies. Although he had already written a book on family and marriage in Mysore and completed his Ph.D. at University of Bombay before he went to the University of Oxford in the late forties for further studies, his training there was to play a significant role in the development of his ideas. Srinivas served in various institutions of repute like University of Delhi, Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Institute for Social and Economic Change Bangalore and National Institute of Advanced Studies Bangalore.[2]. Srinivas died in 1999 at the age of 83.[3]
Contribution to Indian sociology and social anthropology
Srinivas’ contribution to the disciplines of sociology and social anthropology and to public life in India was unique. It was his capacity to break out of the strong mould in which (the mostly North American university oriented) area studies had been shaped after the end of the Second World War on the one hand, and to experiment with the disciplinary grounding of social anthropology and sociology on the other, which marked his originality as a social scientist.
It may be important to point out that it was the conjuncture between Sanskritic scholarship and the strategic concerns of the Western Bloc in the aftermath of the Second World War which had largely shaped South Asian area studies in the United States. During the colonial era, the Brahmins or Pandits were acknowledged as important interlocutors of Hindu laws and customs to the British colonial administration. The colonial assumptions about an unchanging Indian society led to the curious assemblage of Sanskrit studies with contemporary issues in most South Asian departments in the U.S. and elsewhere. It was strongly believed that an Indian sociology must lie at the conjunction of Indology and sociology.
Srinivas’ scholarship was to challenge that dominant paradigm for understanding Indian society and would in the process, usher newer intellectual frameworks for understanding Hindu society. His views on the importance of caste in the electoral processes in India are well known. While some have interpreted this to attest to the enduring structural principles of social stratification of Indian society, for Srinivas these symbolized the dynamic changes that were taking place as democracy spread and electoral politics became a resource in the local world of village society.
By inclination he was not given to utopian constructions – his ideas about justice, equality and eradication of poverty were rooted in his experiences on the ground. His integrity in the face of demands that his sociology should take into account the new and radical aspirations was one of the most moving aspects of his writing. Through use of terms such as Sanskritisation, “dominant caste”, “vertical (inter-caste) and horizontal (intra-caste) solidarities”, Srinivas sought to capture the fluid and dynamic essence of caste as a social institution.[4]
Methodology
As part of his methodological practice, Srinivas strongly advocated ethnographic research based on fieldwork, but his concept of fieldwork was tied to the notion of locally bounded sites. Thus some of his best papers, such as the paper on dominant caste and one on a joint family dispute, were largely inspired from his direct participation (and as a participant observer) in rural life in south India. He wrote several papers on the themes of national integration, issues of gender, new technologies, etc. It is really surprising as to why he did not theorize on the methodological implications of writing on these issues which go beyond the village and its institutions. His methodology and findings have been used and emulated by successive researchers who have studied caste in India.
Recognition
He received many honours from the University of Bombay, the Royal Anthropological Institute, and the Government of France; he has received the Padma Bhushan[5] from the President of India; and he was the honorary foreign member of two prestigious academies: the British Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Books
* Marriage and Family in Mysore (1942)
* Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India (1952)
* Caste in Modern India and other essays (1962), Asia Publishing House
* The Remembered Village (1976)
* Indian Society through Personal Writings (1998)
* Village, Caste, Gender and Method (1998)
* Social Change in Modern India
* The Dominant Caste and Other Essays (ed.)
* Dimensions of Social Change in India
References
1. ^ M.N. Srinivas: Obituary in the Hindu Frontline.
2. ^ Parvathi Memon, Obituary — A scholar remembered:M.N. Srinivas, 1916–1999, The Hindu Volume 16, Issue 26, 11–24 December 1999.
3. ^ Barry Bearak, M. N. Srinivas Is Dead at 83; Studied India’s Caste System, The New York Times, 3 December 1999.
4. ^ Social Change in Modern India, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 2000.
5. ^ Govt of India — List of Padma Bhushan Awardees.
External links
* In memoriam by Veena Das
* An interview with M. N. Srinivas by Chris Fuller, London School of Economics, 1999
* Interview by Jack Goody
* India Today Obit by Jairam Ramesh
* Prof. M.N. Srinivas by Jyotsna Kamat.
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Caste system among South Asian Muslims
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Caste system among South Asian Muslims refers to units of social stratification that have developed among Muslims in South Asia.[1][2]
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Origins
Sources indicate that the castes among Muslims developed as the result of close contact with Hindu culture and Hindu converts to Islam.[1][2][3][4] Religious scholar Yoginder Sikand elaborates that the caste system among Muslims was not due to the “influence of Hinduism among a previously ‘pure’, ‘uncontaminated’ Muslim community,” but rather to “the continued impact of Hindu beliefs and customs on the converts who still remained within a largely Hindu cultural universe and retained many of its associated beliefs and practices”.[4]
Stratification
In some parts of South Asia, the Muslims are divided as Ashrafs and Ajlafs.[5] Ashrafs claim a superior status derived from their foreign ancestry.[6][7] The non-Ashrafs are assumed to be converts from Hinduism, and are therefore drawn from the indigenous population. They, in turn, are divided into a number of occupational castes.[7]
Sections of the ulema (scholars of Islamic jurisprudence) provide religious legitimacy to caste with the help of the concept of kafa’a. A classical example of scholarly declaration of the Muslim caste system is the Fatawa-i Jahandari, written by the fourteenth century Turkish scholar, Ziauddin Barani, a member of the court of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, of the Tughlaq dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate. Barani was known for his intensely casteist views, and regarded the Ashraf Muslims as racially superior to the Ajlaf Muslims. He divided the Muslims into grades and sub-grades. In his scheme, all high positions and privileges were to be a monopoly of the high born Turks, not the Indian Muslims. Even in his interpretation of the Koranic verse “Indeed, the pious amongst you are most honored by Allah”, he considered piety to be associated with noble birth. Barrani was specific in his recommendation that the “sons of Mohamed” [i.e. Ashrafs] “be given a higher social status than the low-born [i.e. Ajlaf].[8]His most significant contribution in the fatwa was his analysis of the castes with respect to Islam.[8] His assertion was that castes would be mandated through state laws or “Zawabi” and would carry precedence over Sharia law whenever they were in conflict.[8] In the Fatwa-i-Jahandari (advice XXI), he wrote about the “qualities of the high-born” as being “virtuous” and the “low-born” being the “custodian of vices”. Every act which is “contaminated with meanness and based on ignominity, comes elegantly [from the Ajlaf]“.[8] Barani had a clear disdain for the Ajlaf and strongly recommended that they be denied education, lest they usurp the Ashraf masters. He sought appropriate religious sanction to that effect.[4] Barrani also developed an elaborate system of promotion and demotion of Imperial officers (“Wazirs”) that was primarily on the basis of their caste.[8]
In addition to the Ashraf/Ajlaf divide, there is also the Arzal caste among Muslims, who were regarded by anti-Caste activists like Babasaheb Ambedkar as the equivalent of untouchables.[9][10] The term “Arzal” stands for “degraded” and the Arzal castes are further subdivided into Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugta, Mehtar etc.[9][10][11] The Arzal group was recorded in the 1901 census in India and are also called Dalit Muslims “with whom no other Muhammadan would associate, and who are forbidden to enter the mosque or to use the public burial ground”. They are relegated to “menial” professions such as scavenging and carrying night soil.[12]
Some South Asian Muslims have been known to stratify their society according to Quoms.[13] These Muslims practise a ritual-based system of social stratification. The Quoms who deal with human emissions are ranked the lowest. Studies of Bengali Muslims in India indicate that the concepts of purity and impurity exist among them and are applicable in inter-group relationships, as the notions of hygiene and cleanliness in a person are related to the person’s social position and not to his/her economic status.[7] Muslim Rajput is another caste distinction among Indian Muslims.
Some of the backward or lower-caste Muslim communities include Ansari, Kunjra, Churihara, Dhobi and Halalkhor. The upper caste Muslim communities include Syed, Sheikh, Pathan, Mirza, and Mallik.[14] Genetic data has also supported this stratification.[15]
The Sachar Committee‘s report commissioned by the government of India and released in 2006, documents the continued stratification in Muslim society.
Interaction and Mobility
Main article: Jajmani system
Interactions between the oonchi zat (upper caste) and neechi zat (lower caste) are regulated by established patron-client relationships of the jajmani system, the upper castes being referred to as the ‘Jajmans’, and the lower caste as ‘Kamin’. Upon contact with a low-caste Muslim, a Muslim of a higher zat can “purify” by taking a short bath, since there are no elaborate rituals for purification.[7] In Bihar state of India, cases have been reported in which the higher caste Muslims have opposed the burials of lower caste Muslims in the same graveyard.[14]
Some data indicates that the castes among Muslims have never been as rigid as that among Hindus.[16] The rate of endogamous marriage, for example, is less than two thirds.[16] An old saying also goes “Last year I was a Julaha (weaver); this year a Shaikh; and next year if the harvest be good, I shall be a Sayyid.”[17] However, other scholars, such as Ambedkar, disagreed with this thesis (see criticism below).
Castes in Pakistan
The social stratification among Muslims in the “Swat” area of North Pakistan has been meaningfully compared to the Caste system in India. The society is rigidly divided into subgroups where each Quom is assigned a profession. Different Quoms are not permitted to intermarry or live in the same community.[13] These Muslims practice a ritual-based system of social stratification. The Quoms who deal with human emissions are ranked the lowest.[13]
Lower castes are often persecuted by the upper castes. A particularly infamous example of such incidents is that of Mukhtaran Mai in Pakistan, a low caste woman who was gang raped by upper caste men.[18]
Stephen M. Lyon of University of Kent has written about what he calls “Gujarism”, the act of Gujjars in Pakistan seeking out other Gujjars to form associations, and consolidate ties with them, based strictly on caste affiliation.[19]
Criticism
Some Muslim scholars have termed the caste-like features in Indian Muslim society as a “flagrant violation of the Qur’anic worldview.” Other scholars tried to reconcile and resolve the “disjunction between Qur’anic egalitarianism and Indian Muslim social practice” through theorizing it in different ways and interpreting the Qur’an and Sharia to justify casteism.[20]
While some scholars theorize that the Muslim Castes are not as acute in their discrimination as that among Hindus,[4][16] Dr B.R.Ambedkar argued otherwise, writing that the social evils in Muslim society were “worse than those seen in Hindu society”.[9][10]
Babasaheb Ambedkar was an illustrious figure in Indian politics and the chief architect of the Indian Constitution. He was extremely critical of the Muslim Caste System and their practices, quoting that “Within these groups there are castes with social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the Hindus but worse in numerous ways”. He was critical of how the Ashrafs regarded the Ajlaf and Arzal as “worthless” and the fact that Muslims tried to sugarcoat the sectarian divisions by using euphemisms like “brotherhood” to describe them. He was also critical of the precept of literalism of scripture among Indian Muslims that led them to keep the Muslim Caste system rigid and discriminatory. He decried against the approval of Shariah to Muslim casteism. It was based on superiority of foreign elements in society which would ultimately lead to downfall of local Dalits. This tragedy would be much more harsher than Hindus who are ethnically related to and supportive of Dalits. This Arabian supremacy in Indian Muslims accounted for its equal disapproval by high and low caste Hindus during 1300 years of Islamic presence in India. He condemned the Indian Muslim Community of being unable to reform like Muslims in other countries like Turkey did during the early decades of the twentieth century.[9][10]
Pakistani-American sociologist Ayesha Jalal writes, in her book, “Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia“, that “Despite its egalitarian principles, Islam in South Asia historically has been unable to avoid the impact of class and caste inequalities. As for Hinduism, the hierarchical principles of the Brahmanical social order have always been contested from within Hindu society, suggesting that equality has been and continues to be both valued and practiced in Hinduism.”[21]
See also
Islam portal
South Asia portal
* Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz
* Islam in India
* List of Muslim Other Backward Classes communities
* Caste system among Indian Christians
* Indian caste system
References
1. ^ a b “Islamic caste.” Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 18 Oct. 2006
2. ^ a b Burton-Page, J. “Hindū.” Encyclopaedia of Islam. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzeland W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2006. Brill Online.
3. ^ Muslim Caste in Uttar Pradesh (A Study of Culture Contact), Ghaus Ansari, Lucknow, 1960, Page 66
4. ^ a b c d Singh Sikand, Yoginder. “Caste in Indian Muslim Society”. Hamdard University. http://stateless.freehosting.net/Caste%20in%20Indian%20Muslim%20Society.htm. Retrieved 2006-10-18.
5. ^ Asghar Ali Engineer. “On reservation for Muslims”. The Milli Gazette. Pharos Media & Publishing Pvt Ltd,. http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/2004/01-15Sep04-Print-Edition/011509200449.htm. Retrieved 2004-09-01.
6. ^ Aggarwal, Patrap (1978). Caste and Social Stratification Among Muslims in India. Manohar.
7. ^ a b c d Social Stratification Among Muslims in India by Zarina Bhatty
8. ^ a b c d e Das, Arbind, Arthashastra of Kautilya and Fatwa-i-Jahandari of Ziauddin Barrani: an analysis, Pratibha Publications, Delhi 1996, ISBN 81-85268-45-2 pgs 124-143
9. ^ a b c d Ambedkar, Bhimrao. Pakistan or the Partition of India. Thackers Publishers.
10. ^ a b c d Web resource for Pakistan or the Partition of India
11. ^ Gitte Dyrhagen and Mazharul Islam (2006-10-18). “Consultative Meeting on the situation of Dalits in Bangladesh”. International Dalit Solidarity Network. Archived from the original on 2007-08-03. http://web.archive.org/web/20070803023637/http://www.idsn.org/Documents/asia/pdf/Bangladesh_full_report.pdf. Retrieved 2007-06-12.
12. ^ Dereserve these myths by Tanweer Fazal,Indian express
13. ^ a b c Barth, Fredrik (1962). “The System Of Social Stratification In Swat, North Pakistan”. In E. R. Leach. Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon, and North-West Pakistan. Cambridge University Press. p. 113. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=2995517. Retrieved 2007-06-12.
14. ^ a b Anand Mohan Sahay. “Backward Muslims protest denial of burial”. Rediff.com. http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/06bihar.htm. Retrieved 2003-03-06.
15. ^ Gene Diversity in Some Muslim Populations of North India Human Biology – Volume 77, Number 3, June 2005, pp. 343-353 – Wayne State University Press
16. ^ a b c Madan, T.N. (1976). Muslim communities of South Asia : culture and society. Vkas Publishing House. p. 114. ISBN 978-0706904628.
17. ^ Ikram, S. M. (1964). “The Interaction of Islam and Hinduism”. Muslim Civilization in India. New York: Columbia University Press. http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/ikram/part1_09.html. Retrieved 2007-06-12.
18. ^ Six men found guilty in gang rape. CNN. Thursday, December 12, 2002.
19. ^ Stephen M. Lyon. “Gujars and Gujarism: simple quaum versus network activism”. University of Kent at Canterbury. http://sapir.ukc.ac.uk/SLyon/Reports/gujarism.html. Retrieved 2007-05-31.
20. ^ Yoginder Singh Sikand, Caste in Indian Muslim Society
21. ^ A. Jalal,Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Contemporary South Asia), Cambridge University Press (May 26, 1995), ISBN 0521478626
Further reading
* Ahmad, Imtiaz (1978). Caste and social stratification among Muslims in India. New Delhi: Manohar. OCLC 5147249.
* Ali, A.F. Imam (September 1993). Changing Social Stratification in Rural Bangladesh. South Asia Books. ISBN 978-8171692675.
* Sikand, Yoginder (2004). Islam, Caste and Dalit Muslim Relations in India. Global Media Publications. ISBN 8188869066.
* Ali, Syed (December 2002). “Collective and Elective Ethnicity: Caste Among Urban Muslims in India”. Sociological Forum 17 (4): 593–620. doi:10.1023/A:1021077323866. ISSN 0884-8971.
* Ahmad, S. Shamim; A. K. Chakravarti (January 1981). “Some regional characteristics of Muslim caste systems in India”. GeoJournal 5 (1): 55–60. doi:10.1007/BF00185243. ISSN 0343-2521.
* Berreman, Gerald D. (June 1972). “Social Categories and Social Interaction in Urban India”. American Anthropologist 74 (3): 567–586. doi:10.1525/aa.1972.74.3.02a00220. ISSN 0002-7294.
External links
* Salil Kader. Social Stratification Among Muslims In India. June 15, 2004.
* Yoginder Singh Sikand. Islam And Caste Inequality Among Indian Muslims.
* Muslims and Caste on anti-caste
* Andhra fatwa draws flak The telegraph, Calcutta – June 22, 2007
Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caste_system_among_South_Asian_Muslims“
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